

I will try to list the general grievances and problems which have plagued our generation, i.e. college '50 - '51, who were recruited at the high tide of international tension. These, I feel, should be considered and approached in a positive way by the powers that be if they intend to lessen the attrition rate. Perhaps steps have already been made in this direction, and if so the progress, if only partial, should be published to all potential career officers. This would be a good start in compensating for the lack of career planning presented to us from the outset. I start out with a chronological phase break-down of our careers ultimately trying to cite what appear to me to be the basic evils and a few recommendations. I should emphasize that the points which I cite as far as grievances and complaints themselves are concerned do not completely stem from my own experiences but are often the result of others' experiences with whom I have talked.

I. Recruiting: We were recruited quite superficially in the rush and tenseness surrounding 1950-51. The interviews could hardly have been termed same, often contingent upon an affirmative answer to such questions as are you willing to jump out of an airplane? I think it is safe to say that outside of college education, language ability, for the few amongst us who had it, the recruiter had no true knowledge as to how capable we really were or into what slot we really fit. At the time we felt that there must have been other reasons for our recruitment.

II. Post Recruiting Lull: The hopeful expectation of being greeted with a definite program of training pointing toward a definite assignment was not met. We often arrived in Washington, having been

hurried away from other tasks only to face days, weeks, and in some cases months of sitting in some kind of an isolated pool for flunkies with no apparent connection to any future assignment. This, of course, did not jibe at all with the importance which we had been led to believe would be part and parcel of our assignment in the recruitment stage.

III. Training: After our clearances were completed we finally got our teeth into some real opportunities for development. Most of the courses in TRD were very good and most of us ate them up, expecting to be closely watched and criticized on our activities. This was not possible with the mass production of the school and few of us got any close assessment. Those who did receive close attention did not seem to be smarter or in any higher positions, but only the lucky recipients of some arbitrary division. (This applies only to TRD.) We left our schooling anxious to get our teeth into some practical application. Once again many of us sat around (I for one month) waiting for our departure overseas.

IV. Post Training Lull: Here again prior to our departure, we felt that at least during this period we might have been given some language training. Instead, many of us never got beyond some female secretary who always managed to shunt us off to the library to read books, interesting, but this was only minutely helpful in overcoming the fact that no one ever said you have now proven yourself in training and have deserved a chance to serve in a junior case officer job overseas in this or that capacity. We waited for the red tape of getting tickets to various parts of the globe, once more with a glimmer of hope that things would be more organized in the field.

V. Assignment Overseas: Most of us departed for this phase with a resurgence of hope. We felt that out where the job was being done the confusion and inefficiency couldn't be as bad as we had found it in Washington. Upon arrival most of us got a rude shock however. The agency personalities with whom we initially came in contact had no idea who we were, what training we had been given, or what jobs we were suited for. There was no apparent coordination from Washington, but then perhaps the latter didn't really know enough about us to staff any personnel reports. Most of us got jobs purely on the basis of immediate need, and by this I mean in accordance with which chiefs had yelled the loudest and hardest and been able to persuade the people at COM that they really needed bodies for the fulfillment of their mission. I am speaking now mostly of the OPC side of things. My experiences with OSO during the last year have been much different, but then I have the distinct feeling that most of the young people who quit were initially assigned to OPC. After finally having been given a job, many people still found that they still didn't have a full day's work. Bosses often had to rack their brains thinking up things for their young apprentices to do. They couldn't have let the young man immediately seek other employment, as this would have lessened the prestige of the chief's position at headquarters. The younger group of newly-hired in OPC also were greeted with a fantastic array of over-paid people. People who were running very poor operations got raises. This in itself is not too bad except when the ultimate failure of the operation leaves the intellectual honesty and moral integrity of the top man in question. It is not hard to visualize that the young man who had been the product of some bureaucratic inefficiency, often just an organization suffering from growing pains, would look upon the high-

level wage scales of OPC with an added feeling of disgust. Also in OPC the young man was given a glimpse of incidents where the actual honesty of the superior was involved, this later became obvious to Headquarters, the man was reprimanded in the field, but subsequently, we heard, ended up in Washington with a better job. We saw other instances where the honesty or good basic judgment of a man was often in question and yet somehow he managed to get a raise either through connections to some top-level type in Washington or because he was able to fill out a fantastic job description including functions which he wasn't actually doing, i.e. were being performed by some contract employee, or simply based on broad terminology which actually gave no true picture of the actual job being done in man-hours and effectiveness.

Other basic things which discouraged the young man in the field were the generally poor security and the promotion situation. As far as both of these problems are concerned, in my opinion, they both need to be solved on a high level and the base chief or section head in the field can do very little. The question of semi-covert positions is of course part and parcel of the cover problem on the whole. We often saw large well-known organizations housing not only the higher level administrative types, but also many of those who actually were in relatively sensitive positions. We never saw nor heard of one example of those few among us who were under deep cover which indicated that they had been given the sufficient amount of training or time to actually live their cover jobs, or know enough about them to avoid being caught up on precise questions. We often were invited to parties including everything from high-level administrative types to actual case

officers from many bases or offices. The concept of compartmentation just didn't seem to exist when it came to making social sacrifices. None of us ever saw a really good example of living your cover. There just wasn't the time to spend on this basic concept.

Many of us have also become discouraged with the general system of promotions. Due to the inordinate wage-scales in OPC and the normal psychology of security which actually develops in the government, many young people have acquired the feeling that they must either keep up with the others or get lost in a whirlpool, or that just because they have been working for a certain period they are automatically entitled to receive a raise. When raises are made they are often based too much on age, time in service and not individual ability. I would be the first to agree that the general scales in the entire agency with the emphasis on OPC are too high. The way to solve it, however, is not to restrict everyone to some common denominator of age^{and}/length of service.

VI. Return Home: I have no way to judge this except from what I have heard from those who have gone before. Apparently the reception depends on the luck in who you see, and often consists of meeting some Washington bureaucrat who has no idea of the field per se and doesn't want to learn anything about it. Apparently the returnee from the field is rarely enthusiastically queried about the experience he has gained in the field, etc. Also the same old routine of waiting and having no real assignment for quite some time often reappears. Often again, Washington has no idea who the returnee is, what he has done or is capable of going.

Out of all of this emerges the fact that if the organization wants to attract young men for a ~~cover~~, they must treat them as career personnel, with a management program similar to those offered by large companies. We

were all asked at the outset if we wanted to make a career of this work. The answers probably varied terrifically. Those who had their wits about them undoubtedly gave an indefinite answer due to their lack of knowledge as to what lay in store for them. Most of them now have become discouraged on a career basis as they have only heard in vague terms of some career program which they are inclined to treat with some degree of skepticism due to other experiences indicating that the entire outfit is too large and unwieldy to even handle promising young men on an individual basis career-wise.

As suggestions I would offer the following. As mentioned before steps are probably being taken in many of these lines already.

a. Each young organization trainee should be hired only after he has been thoroughly tested and investigated. This should be done in such a fashion so as not only to determine whether a person has been a member of communist front organizations, et al, but should attempt to determine a person's ability to get along with others, analytical thinking prowess, languages and area ability, willingness to mix for the most part with peoples of foreign countries and give up the social life he has probably lived in the United States, determination, ingenuity, and the like. If this were the case, almost immediately after a person were hired he could be presented with a general description of his possible future use and development. He should be informed that a few years will be required in doing low-level tasks so as to learn the business from the ground up. It should be emphasized from the outset, however, that in each stage of development the young man must meet a certain standard or else he will be dropped. It is desirable that the young man be hired on a competitive basis. Many security hazards could be minimized if

there were a most careful selection prior to recruitment. It is obvious today that with the great personnel turnover, the security risk is great, as with many young people who resign or are dropped there was very little really known about them prior to hiring and there may be numerous problems in convincing some of these that they must be quiet about their past activities. As the career apprentice passes the first few stages of his development then the factor of being dropped should completely disappear except in cases of gross carelessness and negligence (by this time the outfit should have a pretty fair idea as to whether or not the candidate is essentially capable of performing his job from the standpoint of basic intelligence.). The element of competition should still be held out to the young apprentice as a basis for advancing to the higher stages of a career management program. The competitive spirit on the whole is lacking for the most part amongst the younger generation today in the outfit. They were never approached on this basis.

b. A definite career management program should be made known to the applicant soon after his recruitment. It seems clear that only the most fanatically motivated will devote themselves to a career if they have no general idea where they can expect to be in another 5, 10 or 15 years providing they prove themselves to be of top-flight caliber. Such a career management program should include the following points:

1. A sensible, slow development of the young man to become an expert in the field of operations. Each person should be given the opportunity to get some experience in a cover trade or occupation. If after 10 years a man knows nothing except the basis of operations, it will not only be

extremely difficult for him to have any cover, but also difficult for him to get contacts amongst the important sectors of a foreign population.

2. The prescribed rotation of headquarters & field personnel.

There has never been a good officer in military service, as far as I know, who has not spent many years with the troops prior to going to the Pentagon.

3. A definite program for bridging the gap between specialist and executive. A young man should be told and shown exactly how, if he becomes one of the top specialists in a particular field, i.e. CE, positive, ops, or OPC type work, and has the required potential, he will be able to become station chief, chief of a foreign division, and a member of plans staffs. Something concrete should be held out to him providing, once more, he is one of the most capable among his particular contemporaries.

c. All efforts should be made to develop a personnel board which is fully experienced in operations. They would be much more capable of selecting the proper candidates to begin with. They would be capable of analyzing critically and perhaps even drawing up the job descriptions of each overseas station. The fact that the present system allows people to draw up their own, job descriptions, is not, to my way of thinking, good. There are too many who jump at the opportunity to build up their own positions. I don't feel this latter tendency is due primarily to dishonesty, though I am sure in some cases it is. With the salary pitched at the level it is today a person feels that he must do something to keep up with the general trend, i.e. OPC types hired at 12's & 13's whereas OSO people with several years of experience often were hired at 9 or 11. An operationally experienced personnel board would be much more capable of deciding what a man is actually worth.

d. With regard to promotions the word of the base chief or recommending party should be taken as final except where a case of empire-building exists. I assume, however, that gradually empire-builders will no longer be base or project chiefs. The point I am trying to make is that the recommending officer has the best idea of the actual value of an employee. It seems to me that all the higher boards can do is to approve or disapprove on the basis of age, years in service and the like. This, of course, would be different were each personnel man operationally experienced and capable of discussing the problem with the base chief. It is a quick way to snap incentive if a person knows he can't get a certain grade until he reaches a certain age, etc.

e. As the young career trainee is sent out to the field or assigned to Washington desk, each base or delegated section chief should have as one of his important responsibilities the guided on the job training of his subordinates. There are good systems of on-the-job training at work today, but in many instances it just isn't in existence. Many higher officers simply do not have either the time, ability or desire or combinations of these three to devote to the younger man. This must be changed and emphasis must come from Washington that the development of the young career officer is important and each chief responsible for fitness reports, must report on the young man in terms of his future potential. If such phrases as "I consider this man to be a below-average junior case officer who will be ready for operations of his own only after several years of basic fundamentals", then the reporting officer would be put on the spot as regards his judgment on younger men. Each person with young career employees under ~~their~~ ^{his} control should also be responsible for reporting at set intervals

on exactly what steps have been taken to train the young man during that period. These requirements would emphasize the importance in training younger men to all hands and would also help prevent inaccurate or intentionally inaccurate assessments of junior officers by the more experienced superiors. In conclusion, each man should be called in for conferences on their fitness reports by the reporting officer. Only in this fashion can a young man learn exactly how he is doing, where he stands, and what mistakes must be corrected.